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Recent Cases
TAXATION-TAx CONSEQUENCES OF INTA-FAmvUlLy ASSsINNMNTs-Peti-
tioner, taxpayer, invented and owned a patentable invention. He sold
his patent rights to a manufacturing corporation, under a contract of
sale by which he was to receive a stipulated sum based on the number
of units sold. He received payment under this arrangement for six
years, then made an absolute assignment of the contract and all pay-
ments to be received thereunder to his wife. A federal gift tax was
paid and the wife received all subsequent payments for her sole use
and benefit. Although the Commissioner conceded such payments to
be gain from the sale of a capital asset, a deficiency was determined
against petitioner for the taxable year 1947, based on the Commis-
sioner's contention that the transfer was merely an anticipatory as-
signment of future income. The court, in affirming the lower court,
held the assignment to be an absolute conveyance of property and
property rights, making the income from such property taxable to the
assignee and not the assignor. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Reece, 283 F. 2d 80 (CA 1, 1956) 24 T.C. 187 (1955).
Under the present Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer in the higher
tax brackets is subjected to a progressive tax burden at a rate much
greater than his earning increase.1 An often-used method of avoiding
such an undesirable situation is to shift a portion of this income to
other members of the family who are in lower rate brackets. 2 In the
case at hand, tax minimization achieved through the device of gratui-
tous intra-family assignments was judicially approved, subject only to
the qualification that the income-producing property be completely
separated from the assignor.
Since our tax system regards the individual as the unit of income
taxation, assignment is obviously highly beneficial as a means of rate
reduction to the high-income taxpayer. Since the 1948 Amendment
to the statute permits the spouses, by their election, to file a joint re-
turn and thus achieve the income-splitting advantage, property trans-
fer between husband and wife is no longer necessary.3 Nevertheless,
1 Int. Rev. Code, Sec. 1(a) (1954). Under the rate set out a person making
$100,001 would pay $67,320.89-if his income increases to %L50,001 his tax is
$111,820.90; thus as his income increases by 50%. his tax rate increases over 66%.
2 See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74 L. Ed. 731 (1930);
Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330 81 L. Ed. 465 (1937); Helvering v.
Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 61 S. Ct. 149, 85 L. Ed. 81 (1940), etc.
a Int. Rev. Code, See. 6013 (1954).
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the principle of saving taxes through income splitting has great po-
tential when applied to the high bracket taxpayer who transfers prop-
erty to members of his family, other than his spouse, who are in a lower
bracket. Though most intra-family assignment cases arose before the
joint income option and do involve property transfers between husband
and wife (as does the present case), they provide valuable analogies
applicable to situations involving other gratuitous assignments.
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Due to lack of any definite provision in the Code regarding the
intra-family assignment, the duty of defining the validity and tax con-
sequences resulting from these attempts at lessening taxes vests
squarely upon the courts. In cases involving assignments, in order to
determine who is taxable the court must generally make two basic
findings:
(1) Was there an assignment in fact?
(2) If so, what was assigned?
As to the assignment itself, there is usually little controversy since both
assignor and assignee are best served if they can establish an assign-
ment. It is in deciding what was assigned that the court has the more
difficult task.
Assignments generally concern income derived from labor, trusts,
or capital 8 Where income derived from labor is assigned, it is taxable
to the assignor regardless of attempts at diversion.0 Assignment of trust
income, though formerly governed by the nature of the trust and the
circumstances of the case, is now treated in the Regulations, and cer-
tain of determination. 7 Therefore, the present area of dispute appears
fairly limited to those instances of assignment of capital realization.
The decisions of the courts as to whether tax shall be imposed upon
the assignor or assignee have developed along two well-defined lines.
The first situation is where the owner of an income-producing property
assigns the income therefrom to another. In cases arising under such
circumstances the courts hold the income taxable to the assignor re-
gardless of the good faith and validity of the assignment.8 For example,
if the taxpayer makes a gift of an interest coupon, but retains the
income-producing bond itself, he is taxable upon the income realized
from the coupon.9
4 See, e.g., Helvering v. Seatree, 72 F. 2d 67 (CA DC, 1934), Carl G. Drey-
mann v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 153 (1948).
G For complete categorization and explanations, see Soil, "Intra-Family As-
signments", 6 Tax L. Rev. 485 (1951), and 7 Tax L. Rev. 61 (1952).
6 Lucas v. Earl, Helvering v. Eubank, supra note 2.
7 Income Tax Regulations, Sec. 39.22(a)-21 et seq. (1956); Int. Rev. Code
see. 671 et seq. 8 Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F. 2d 594 (CA 5 1952).
9 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75, 131 A.L.R.
655 (1940).
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The second line of decisions arises from an absolute assignment of
the income-producing property, itself. In these cases, the courts hold
such assignments constitute the assignee the sole taxable person as to
income derived from the assigned property.10 Thus, where the tax-
payer, a retiring partner, assigned his right to payments under a part-
nership agreement providing compensation for good will, the income
thereunder was not taxable as income of the assignor."
As a simple illustration, let us suppose that A, a father in a high
tax bracket, owns rental property. If he assigns only the rent to be
realized from the property to B, his son in a lower bracket, A is still
held to be the taxable person and has not lessened his tax burden; but
if A assigns the property itself to B, then B is the taxable person and A
has avoided the higher tax rate.1
2
The rule, while easily stated, is not always so easy in its application.
It is especially difficult to apply in the cases involving contracts under
patent rights and/or for royalties. The assignment may be of the con-
tract which substitutes for the patent right (the Reece case), in which
case it will be a transfer of property, taxable to the assignee only. In
the case of Nelson v. Ferguson,13 the court considered a contract quite
similar to that in the Reece case. In defining the nature of the assign-
ment, the court said:
[Ilt must be kept in mind that the thing assigned was not... future
salary or personal earnings ... but was an existing thing, namely:
property in a contract. The assignment being of property was there-
fore not merely an assignment of income when earned, though from
the property assigned profits and income were expected to flow.14
On the other hand, the contract may contemplate personal services
to be, or having been, performed by one party with a percentage of
gross sales fixed as the rate of compensation. In this instance, the
assignor remains taxable on the income though he has completely as-
signed it to another. Such a case was Strauss v. Commr'r,'5 where the
taxpayer, by virtue of personal services rendered, received a certain
percentage of the royalties paid on a patented process for the manu-
facture of colored film. He assigned all his right, title, and interest to
his wife, who reported income derived therefrom. The court held
such income taxable to the assignor, and stated the rule:
10 Helvering v. Seatree, supra note 4.
"1 Ibid.
12 There is nothing legally wrong or morally reprehensible about avoidance
of taxes; see Learned Hand's dissent in Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F. 2d 848, 850
(CA 2, 1947).
1356 F. 2d 121 (CA 3, 1932).
'4 Id. at 124.
15 168 F. 2d 441 (CA 2, 1948).
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It has been well settled since Lucas v. Earl... that com-
pensation derived from personal service is taxable to the one who
performs the services whether or not he actually receives the com-
pensation or transfers the right to receive it before it is earned.16
The court, in the Reece case, had to determine the exact nature of
the contract. In deciding that the substituted contract was "property"
and thus not taxable to the assignor, the court reached the proper re-
sult. Had the court decided to the contrary, it might well have been
argued that all gratuitous assignments-whether made to persons in or
out of the family-were nullities as far as tax diversion was concerned.
The Reece decision is important not only for its recognition of the
intra-family assignment, but also for its refusal to impose judicial tax-
ation in an area omitted in the Code. The problem of tax consequences
of assignment has been a center of controversy and litigation for several
decades. Yet, as the court here noted, Congress has not seen fit to pre-
scribe a cure.17 It is only logical to expect a certain reluctance on the
part of the courts to adjudicate a tax under the circumstances, but
here the court went beyond mere refusal and affirmatively stated a
limitation on the function of the court.'
8
The effect of the Reece decision is very favorable to the taxpayer. If
one makes an actual and absolute assignment, and is careful to assign,
not the income alone, but the entire property, such taxpayer may
effectively divert the income thereon to his assignee for purposes of
taxation. Further, the tax benefits from assignments have survived the
1948 Amendment and the 1954 Code, and will remain available under
current decisions, unless and until Congress legislates to the contrary.
L. Fuhrman Martin
ZONING-WEEN HAS ONE AN ExisTm USE? Appellant Caruthers pur-
chased 12.09 acres of land one month before the city of Bunker Hill,
Texas was incorporated and five months before the enactment of its
zoning ordinance. After the property had been surveyed for the pur-
pose of developing twenty-three building sites as a residential sub-
division and a plat completed, Caruthers staked out pins to mark each
lot. He constructed a single street, placed a shelltop on it and added
a concrete curbing on its sides. A concrete culvert was constructed at
16 Id. at 442.
17 82d Cong. 1st Sess., S. Rep. No. 781 (1951): "Income from property is
attributable to the owner of the property... If an individual makes a bona fide
gift of real estate, or a share of corporate stock, the rent or dividend income is
taxable to the donee."
18 Reece v. Comm'r, 233 F. 2d 30, 33 (CA 1, 1956).
